

# **SIDC OPSCOM Report**

## **Critical Incident Experienced on 25/03/2026**


10.04.2026

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# 1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.

## 1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.


Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book. If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades. While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) make cross-zonal capacity available for allocation in SIDC as additional capacity is released or recalculated during trading.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until the relevant contract trading end time or, where applicable, until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) for cross-zonal trading is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, electricity is physically delivered for the relevant delivery period. Continuous intraday trading for subsequent delivery periods may continue, subject to applicable gate closure times and the arrangements of the relevant TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

### SIDC continuous normal operation process



\*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some borders, 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, others will follow. For updates, please follow the NEMO Committee and ENTSO-E websites.

CZC – cross-zonal capacity  
IDCZGCT – intraday cross-zonal gate **closure** time  
IDCZGOT – intraday cross-zonal gate **opening** time  
LTS – local trading system  
MP – market participants  
OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions occur.

## **1.2. Incident Management Process**

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, shipping agent, explicit participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and any required communication to market participants.

Typically within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

## 2. Incident Description

This report provides information to stakeholders regarding the critical incident that occurred on 25/03/2026, affecting the Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) market.

On 25/03/2026 at 15:34 one XBID module was not working due to a system failover. Hence, the IC SPoC opened a critical ticket with the XBID service provider to solve the issue and an Incident Committee was triggered.

The XBID service provider investigated the issue and performed the required actions to solve it. At 16:05 the XBID service provider confirmed that all modules were up and running again. All parties present in the Incident Committee informed that they could access all modules. Hence, at 16:20 the IDCT (Intraday Continuous Trading) market was reopened as agreed during the Incident Committee.

### 2.1 Course of Events

### 2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
<b>Incident occurrence</b>	25/03/2026; 15:34	25/03/2026; 16:20
<b>Triggering of Incident Committee.</b>	25/03/2026; 15:39	25/03/2026; 16:22

At 15:34, an XBID module was not working due to a core failover.

At 15:39, a critical ticket with the XBID service provider was created. An Incident Committee was triggered.

At 15:40, the XBID service provider joined the Incident Committee call.

At 15:43, the XBID service provider explained that the module was down because of a switch from the primary server to the secondary.

At 15:45, all parties indicated that they were connected to the central systems.

At 15:46, the XBID service provider informed that they were checking the root cause internally because the primary server was experiencing technical issues.

At 15:55, the XBID service provider indicated that they needed to restart the application.

At 16:03, the XBID service provider indicated that the application was restarted and that the parties did not need to reconnect to the central systems.

At 16:05, all parties agreed to set the reopening time of the market at 16:20.

At 16:10, the XBID service provider indicated that the issue was due to a human error.

At 16:20, the IC SPOC reopened the market.

At 16:22, it was agreed that the Incident Committee could be finished.

## 2.3 Incident Cause

According to the Root Cause Analysis provided by the XBID service provider, the incident was caused by an unintended manual error introduced during the scheduled maintenance in the morning of 25/03/2026. Although the system was released back into production and the market resumed trading, a core failover was triggered approximately two hours later, causing a central application to go down.

The issue was identified and corrected during the incident call, after which all services were restored and the market was unhalted. The incident is not related to high load in the system.

## 2.4 Impact

<b>Downtime</b>	46 minutes
<b>Critical Business Process Impacted</b>	IDCT Trading
<b>Procedural Impact</b>	N/A

### 3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue happening again, the following measures have been taken:

<b>Supplier’s Short-Term Measures</b>	The XBID service provider solved the issue to restore the central system.
<b>Supplier’s Long-Term Measures</b>	Additional validation and cross review steps are being implemented to prevent similar incidents caused by human error(s) in the future.
<b>SIDC Project Lessons Learnt</b>	Several proposals are currently in discussion to avoid that preparatory activities from the XBID service provider can affect the IDCT market.