

SIDC OPSCOM Report

Critical Incident Experienced on 24/03/2026


10.04.2026

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1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.¹

¹ This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.

1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.


Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book. If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades. While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) make cross-zonal capacity available for allocation in SIDC as additional capacity is released or recalculated during trading.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until the relevant contract trading end time or, where applicable, until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) for cross-zonal trading is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, electricity is physically delivered for the relevant delivery period. Continuous intraday trading for subsequent delivery periods may continue, subject to applicable gate closure times and the arrangements of the relevant TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

SIDC continuous normal operation process



*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some borders, 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, others will follow. For updates, please follow the NEMO Committee and ENTSO-E websites.

CZC – cross-zonal capacity
 IDCZGCT – intraday cross-zonal gate **closure** time
 IDCZGOT – intraday cross-zonal gate **opening** time
 LTS – local trading system
 MP – market participants
 OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions occur.

1.2. Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, shipping agent, explicit participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and any required communication to market participants.

Typically within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

2. Incident Description

This report provides information to stakeholders regarding the critical incident that occurred on 24/03/2026, affecting the Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) market.

On 24/03/2026 at 16:31 a NEMO noticed that several XBID modules were not working due to automatic triggering of system failover. Hence, the NEMO opened a major ticket with the XBID service provider since the issue seemed to be on XBID side and an Incident Committee was triggered.

During the Incident Committee, the other NEMOs and TSOs shared the same view as the concerned NEMO regarding the availability of the different XBID modules.

XBID service provider investigated the issue and performed the required actions to solve it. At 20:53, the XBID service provider confirmed that all modules were up and running again. All parties present in the Incident Committee informed that they could access all modules. Hence, at 21:05 the IDCT (Intraday Continuous Trading) market was reopened as agreed during the Incident Committee.

2.1 Course of Events

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence	24/03/2026; 16:31	24/03/2026; 21:05
Triggering of Incident Committee	24/03/2026; 16:37	24/03/2026; 21:42

At 16:31, one NEMO noticed that several XBID modules were not working due to a core failover.

At 16:37, a major ticket with the XBID service provider was created. An Incident Committee was triggered.

At 16:47, the XBID service provider joined the Incident Committee call.

At 16:54, the XBID service provider explained that they were doing internal checks to identify the issue.

At 17:22, the XBID service provider initiated the restart of their services.

At 18:14, the XBID service provider informed that the core failover was related to preparatory activities for the scheduled maintenance on the day after.

At 18:54, the XBID service provider indicated that the restart of their services was unsuccessful. So, they escalated internally the investigation.

At 19:43, an intermittent connection was observed.

At 20:38, some parties had access to the central modules.

At 20:53, the XBID service provider informed that the service was restored after applying corrective measures on their side.

At 20:55, the parties agreed to set the reopening time of the market at 21:05.

At 21:05, the IC SPOC reopened the market.

At 21:10, some parties indicated that they had issues connecting to the central systems.

At 21:42, all parties were connected to central systems, therefore it was agreed that the Incident Committee could be finished.

2.3 Incident Cause

According to the Root Cause Analysis provided by the XBID Service Provider, the incident was triggered by a memory corruption condition, which caused the platform to lose access to required resources and initiate an automatic failover. During this transition, several dependent services did not recover cleanly, which temporarily resulted in connectivity issues and degraded functionality. The issue has since been resolved, and normal service was restored.

2.4 Impact

Downtime	4 hours 34 minutes
Critical Business Process Impacted	IDCT Trading
Procedural Impact	N/A

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Supplier’s Short-Term Measures	The XBID service provider solved the issue to restore the central system.
Supplier’s Long-Term Measures	N/A
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	Several proposals are currently in discussion to avoid that preparatory activities from the XBID service provider can affect the IDCT market.