SIDC OPSCOM Report on Cancellation with Regards to the Intraday Auction 1 for Delivery Date 03/06/2025

10.06.2025

1. Executive Summary

This report informs stakeholders on the critical incident related to the Intraday Auction 1 for delivery date 03/06/2025.

Impacted NEMOs

OMIE, EPEX, BSP, EMCO, IBEX, CROPEX, OTE, OKTE, OPCOM, TGE, HUPX, GME, HENEX.

Impacted Bidding Zones

NL, BE, FR, DE/LU, AT, PL, NO, SE, FI, DK, SI, HU, CZ, LT, LI, EE, BG, HR, SK, RO, ES, PT, IT, GR.

Impacted Borders

All borders.

Cause of Incident

Due to an unexpected and unforeseeable technical issue, OPCOM's system used for market coupling became unresponsive at the moment when the market coupling results were shared. Due to this, the backup procedures were applied. As OPCOM is servicing OKTE, the same results received from Coordinator were also sent to OKTE for validation purposes. The NEMO which faced the situation with the unresponsive system is also a service provider for other NEMOs which consequently were affected by the same situation.

Even if there are operational procedures in place which would have allowed market coupling parties to confirm the results in backup mode (also known as deemed acceptance process), this was not possible. OKTE encountered some technical issues during the automatic sending of the preliminary confirmation, which could not be solved in time before the IDA1 cancellation deadline.

The issues that arose during the session were mitigated, therefore the IDA2 session for delivery date 03/06/2025 went smoothly and the results were published according to the normal procedural timings.

2. Intraday Auctions Explained

SIDC creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. As renewable intermittent production such as solar and wind energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the Day-Ahead market.

Complementing the continuous intraday trading, the newly introduced intraday auctions are designed to enhance the efficiency of the market by harmonizing the calculation and allocation of cross-border capacities, while pricing intraday cross-border capacities to reflect their shortage at a given time and thereby send an adequate price signal to the market.

Intraday auctions provide the ability to accumulate offers and efficiently allocate the scarce transmission capacity. This is a novelty in the intraday timeframe, since capacity in the continuous intraday trading was allocated - before the introduction of IDAs - on a first-come first served basis. IDAs are the first intraday auction involving most of the European countries.

See for more information the following websites:

- ENTSO-E
- NEMO Committee

2.1 Normal Process & Timings

MCSC Daily Timeline

SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T (Including Extension)



Intraday Auctions are organized multiple times per day with a predefined moment in time for the closure of the Orderbooks, commonly known as Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes prior to this Order Book Gate Closure Time, the allocation of Cross Zonal Capacity via Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is halted to allow the TSOs to update capacities based on the latest capacity calculations and accordingly provide the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints to the Intraday Auction. Starting from the Order Book Gate Closure Time,

the NEMOs share the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints between the involved NEMO systems. From that same moment on, the NEMOs start delivering their Order Books to the central NEMO systems running the Intraday Auction. As soon as the NEMOs have provided the Order Books the actual coupling starts, considering the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints.

Once the Intraday Auction results are available, NEMOs start validating the results and these are made available to the TSO for validation by the Capacity Management Module of SIDC and for actual allocation of the Cross Zonal Capacity on respective Bidding Zone Borders. All these steps are to be completed within a strict time window, after which automatically the reopening of cross border trading in Continuous Trading will be triggered, and automatic cancellation of the Intraday Auction will take place.

2.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels connecting them. An incident that requires triggering an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (Local) Backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline of the SIDC.

The operational parties agreed to follow the Incident Management procedure to handle incidents. The Incident Management procedure assumes that communication to relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants, etc.) is done by the involved TSOs and NEMOs by following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure outlines how incidents are handled. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of procedures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, closing and restarting market or delivery area(s) or trading service and corresponding local procedures, exchanging files using a backup mode, etc.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Market Coupling processes, an Incident Committee (IC) needs to be started, which will be convened by the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator.

Participants to the Incident Committee (IC) identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC/IDA Coordinator tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee (IC), and the decision(s) taken during the Incident Committee (IC) call.

At the start of the Incident Committee (IC) the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter and/or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident for XBID related incidents.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident, where needed, on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee (IC) the parties also decide on the deemed necessary communication to the Market Participants.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee (IC) call the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator will create/finalize the Incident Committee (IC) report and make it available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review, and if applicable, update the Incident Committee (IC) report. In case of IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC will create the Incident Committee (IC) report and in case of IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator will be in charge.

3. Incident Description

3.1 Course of Events

Incident(s) were reported during the coupling phase, 15:13 CEST, when the PMB was unresponsive, not allowing the relevant NEMO to perform validation actions by the system. An Incident Committee was immediately launched by the coordinator, followed by backup procedural application by all market coupling parties. Based on the current joint operational procedures, files were exchanged in backup mode. Even if market coupling parties followed the procedures, an unforeseen technical issue regarding the automatic sending of one NEMO's confirmation could not be solved before the IDA1 cancellation deadline was declared, which is set in the procedures at 15:27 CEST (for this particular situation). As a consequence, borders in XBID were re-opened and trading resumed in the continuous intraday trading.

3.2 Timeline

Event	Start Date & Time	End Date & Time
Incident occurrence	02/06/2025 15:13 CEST	
Triggering of Incident Committee	02/06/2025 15:16 CEST	02/06/2025 15:40 CEST
Back-up solution applied	02/06/2025 15:20 CEST	
IDA cancelled	02/06/2025 15:27 CEST	

3.3 Incident Cause

The incident was caused, on the one hand, by an unexpected and unforeseeable technical issue in the PMB application which led to the impossibility of exchanging files in the PMB Cloud. On the other hand it was also caused by a technical issue occurred on a serviced NEMO during the NEMO confirmation phase.

3.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Borders

Impacted NEMOs

OMIE, EPEX, BSP, EMCO, IBEX, CROPEX, OTE, OKTE, OPCOM, TGE, HUPX, GME, HENEX.

Impacted Bidding Zones

NL, BE, FR, DE/LU, AT, PL, NO, SE, FI, DK, SI, HU, CZ, LT, LI, EE, BG, HR, SK, RO, ES, PT, IT, GR.

4. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party	PMB: The issue was solved with the restart of the PMB servers and no occurrence since then happened again. However, this is something that cannot be predicted. OKTE: The issue was solved immediately after the IDA1.
Long-term Measures by Affected Party	PMB: The issue was solved with the restart of the PMB servers and no occurrence since then happened again. However, this is something that cannot be predicted OKTE: The issue was solved immediately after the IDA1.
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	N/A – Procedures were followed correctly.