

Confidential document

Version 2.0, date 04.05.2026

IDCT_NEMO_BUP_01: Transaction Process

Version	2.0	
Date	04.05.2026	
Status	<input type="checkbox"/> Draft	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Final

Approval

Version	Date	Name	Function	Signature

Previous versions

Version	Date	Author	Summary of changes
2.0	04.05.2026	PWG	Changing the name ██████ to ██████
1.9	10.02.2026	PWG	Update of the alert message ██████ to ensure triggering the IC call always when the message is received
1.8	16.09.2025	PWG	Changing the event description in the Annex 1. Events and notification messages (██████)
1.7	2.10.2024	PWG	Renaming SOB ComTrader to Market Admin Tool (cases 6, 8)
1.6	16.5.2024	PWG	XBID -> IDCT renaming
1.5	29.11.2022	PWG	██████ mail and SMS message amended
1.4	1.4.2022	PWG	Cases 6 and 7 amended
1.3	1.9.2020	PWG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cases 8 and 9 added - Case 7 reformulated - Minor enhancements in other cases
1.2	26.7.2019	PWG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Annex 1 table updated - the description and e-mail text of the event code ██████ has been updated
1.1	25.4.2018	PWG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Table 1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Case 1 renamed o removed duplicated assignment of AlarmTilt events to cases in the procedure - Chapter 2.2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Case 1 renamed o Case 1 description modified: ██████

			<p>[Redacted]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Annex 1<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Two [Redacted] messages names were aligned○
1.0	19.1.2018	PWG	Final version for the ANIDOA.

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Notice	This document is part of the operational manual of XBID and is governed by change control. Any change to this document shall follow the NEMO Change Control procedure, following ANIDOA contract. The content of this document might have evolved by the time you read or use this document. Please contact the NEMO Change Control Administrator to check that this is the latest version before using this document.
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1. Introduction

This backup procedure describes all the risk cases related to the steps of the procedure IDCT_NEMO_NOR_01 and their relevant solutions.

The process concerned by this backup procedure is the transaction process, managed in the Shared Order Book (SOB) module, integrated in the XBID solution.

Capitalized terms used in this document shall have the meaning set forth in Annex 1, unless if defined differently in this document.

1.1. Purpose

As a general remark, the XBID backup procedures aim at offering a common framework to which all the local backup procedures must be aligned accordingly.

The purpose of this procedure is to provide the Operators with an overview of the applicable backup solutions in case of issues during the transaction process, which might jeopardize the Single IntraDay Coupling (SIDC).

The below mentioned backup solutions may be applied at any time when receiving information about the SOB.

1.2. Governed / Regulated by

- All NEMO Intraday Operations Agreement (ANIDOA)
- High Level Architecture (HLA)
- HLS100 –Functional Description SOB
- DFS510 – AMQP Public Message Interface - Trading

1.3. Associated procedures

Normal procedures:

- IDCT_NEMO_NOR_01: Transaction Process
- NEMOs market rules

Other associated procedures:

- IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01: Incident Management Procedure (as included in Exhibit 6 to the IDOA (Joint IDCT Procedures))
- IDCT_NEMO_EXC_03: Market suspension and reactivation
- IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02: Internal and external communication
- IDCT_NEMO_OTH_03: XBID NEMO Admins

User Manual

- XBID System User Manual

2. Procedure

2.1. General overview

The table below lists all the risk cases that were identified in procedure IDCT_NEMO_NOR_01 and indicates which actions should be taken on XBID System level or on the LTS level to solve the identified issues.

Table 1 – Risk cases associated to the Transaction Process

Message	Case	Transaction Process issue description	From	To	Procedures involved
[REDACTED]	1	XBID Problems detected by NEMOs or by the Service(s) Provider(s)	LTS	XBID	IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01, IDCT_NEMO_EXC_03, IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02
[REDACTED]	2	Local LTS problems	LTS	-	IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02, IDCT_NEMO_EXC_03
[REDACTED]	3	SOB is down	SOB	LTS	IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01, IDCT_NEMO_EXC_03, IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02
[REDACTED]	4	SM is down	SM	LTS	IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01, IDCT_NEMO_EXC_03, IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02
	5	Global product issues	LTS	-	IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02, IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01
	6	Invalid trade	LTS	-	IDCT_NEMO_OTH_03, IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01
	7	Harmonization of price ranges with Day-Ahead	SDAC / e-mail		-
	8	Market Admin Tool is down or was temporary unavailable	Market Admin Tool	-	IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01
[REDACTED]	9	The SOB service is halted (not set to trading)	SOB	LTS	IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01, IDCT_NEMO_EXC_03

2.2. Risk Cases - Process clarification

Case 1: XBID Problems detected by NEMOs or Service(s) Provider(s)

For this case, it is expected that LTS has connectivity and is up and running. The error is suspected to originate from the XBID System or from the MPLS connection to the XBID System. Therefore the issue is global and affects all NEMO(s).

The Local Trading Solution (LTS) detects cases, like:

- LTS does not receive an acknowledgement from the SOB; or
- LTS receives an error message from the SOB; or
- LTS does not match orders in the orderbook
- LTS loses the connection with XBID

Other potential issues related to the connectivity can be:

- Connectivity loss detected through SOB WebGui
- Connectivity loss detected through Market Admin Tool
- Any issue detected by the Service(s) Provider(s)

Steps to be followed

1. To raise a ticket (Major or Critical) in the ticket system of the service provider in order to trigger an Incident Committee (IC), and in parallel to call to the Service Provider Helpdesk and to the IC SPOC, following the IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01: Incident Management Procedure (as included in Exhibit 6 to the IDOA (Joint IDCT Procedures)).



Case 2: Local LTS problems

For this case, it is expected that LTS is experiencing some local issue (e.g. LTS local problems, connectivity loss, etc.) which has not been caused by the XBID System. This issue is negatively impacting cross-border trading capabilities of the affected NEMO.

Steps to be followed

1. For local issues there is no need for an Incident Committee as the problem is on a local level. The concerned NEMO follows a local procedure to try to solve the issue.
 - a. Concerned NEMO should verify if the issue is local by checking internally with company experts. If it is confirmed, then follow remaining steps of this case and local procedure.
 - b. If it is found out that the issue is global then end here and start with case more

appropriate for global issues.

[REDACTED]

Note: If it is found out that the issue is Global, follow other cases of this procedure.

Case 3: SOB down

This case describes the required actions when the SOB Core is down. This situation can be detected through LTS, SOB WebGUI or Market Admin Tool [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Note: CMM is not covered in this procedure because if CMM is down the cross-border trading is not possible and only local trading can be performed in the SOB. Nevertheless, no action is needed from the SOB perspective.

Steps to be followed

1. Check the availability of SM. If SM is down, abandon this process description and follow the case 4: *SM down*.
2. To raise a Critical ticket in IMT to trigger an Incident Committee (IC), and in parallel to call to the DBAG Helpdesk and to the IC SPOC following the Incident Management procedure IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01).

[REDACTED]

4. Following steps have to be followed:
 - 4.1. All NEMOs to inform their related TSOs (following the local arrangements) about the issue (for example by sending the message [REDACTED] following IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02).
 - 4.2. All NEMOs may inform market participants according to the local agreements about the issue by forwarding the message.

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

Case 4: SM is down

This case describes the required actions when the Shipping Module (SM) Core is down. [Redacted]

Steps to be followed

1. To raise a Critical ticket in IMT to trigger an Incident Committee (IC), and in parallel to call to the DBAG Helpdesk and to the IC SPOC following the Incident Management procedure IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01).

[Redacted]

4. Following steps have to be followed:
 - 4.1. All NEMOs to inform their related TSOs (following the local arrangements) about the issue, for example by sending the message [Redacted] according to IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02.
 - 4.2. All NEMOs may inform market participants according to the local agreements about the issue by forwarding the message.

[Redacted]

Case 5: Global products issues

This case describes the required actions when Global Product is not configured correctly.

Steps to be followed

1. To raise a Critical or Major ticket in IMT to trigger an Incident Committee (IC), and in parallel to call to the DBAG Helpdesk and to the IC SPOC following the Incident Management procedure (IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01).

[REDACTED]

4. All NEMOs to inform their related TSOs (following the local arrangements) about the product deactivation according to IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02 by sending the message [REDACTED].
5. All NEMOs may inform market participants according to the local agreements about the issue by forwarding the message.

[REDACTED]

8. NCA to inform all NEMOs about the product activation according to IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02 by sending the message [REDACTED] with the aligned timing of activation.
9. All NEMOs to inform their related TSOs (following the local arrangements) about the product activation by for example forwarding the message [REDACTED]
10. All NEMOs may inform market participants according to the local agreements about the issue by forwarding the message.

[REDACTED]

Case 6: Invalid/erroneous trade

This case will describe the required actions when an unexpected error of the XBID System that leads to an invalid/erroneous trade.

Steps to be followed

1. To raise a Major or Critical ticket in IMT to trigger an Incident Committee (IC), and in parallel to call to the DBAG Helpdesk and to the IC SPOC following the Incident Management procedure (IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01). ID of invalid trade has to be submitted in the IMT ticket. DBAG have to be requested in the ticket description to perform the analysis to confirm whether the trade(s) is invalid or not.

1.1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. Both involved NEMOs send the trade(s) ID(s) of the respective trade(s) via e-mail to the NCA. NCA proceeds in case trade IDs from both e-mails are the same.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NCA should be very careful, when selecting trades for cancelling, because this action has huge impact and once cancelled trades cannot be activated after.

[REDACTED]

9. NCA to inform all NEMOs about the trade cancellation according to IDCT_NEMO_OTH_02 by sending the message [REDACTED]
10. Each affected NEMO(s) (which were involved in the cancelled trade(s)) verifies the action and confirms the resolution to other parties in the IC.

Case 7: Harmonization of price ranges with Day-Ahead

According to article 4 of [“Harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices for single intraday coupling in accordance with Article 54\(1\) of Commission Regulation \(EU\) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management \(CACM Regulation\)”](#), in case the maximum clearing price is increased in SDAC above the maximum clearing price in SIDC (in XBID and IDA SCF), or in case the minimum clearing price is decreased in SDAC below the minimum clearing price in SIDC (in XBID and IDA SCF), this price in XBID and IDA SCF also has to be updated to be equal to the price in SDAC. The change in XBID and IDA SCF must be implemented and put into effect at the same time as in SDAC.

SDAC informs SIDC parties about this update in e-mail with subject **“(POST_Exc_07): Maximum and minimum clearing price Threshold detection in SDAC– Details** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Maximum and Minimum Clearing Price Management”

Case 8: Market Admin Tool is down or was temporary unavailable

This case describes the required actions to follow when it is found that the **Market Admin Tool is unavailable or was unavailable** but is operating again.

the following process describes recommended measures which should be beneficial for all parties, including DBAG, because the unavailability of Market Admin Tool can signal an infrastructure or connectivity issue which might potentially impact also other more critical modules and the operations.

Steps to be followed

1. Check the availability of SOB. If SOB is down, abandon this process description and follow the case 3: *SOB down*.

3. Double check that the Market Admin Tool unavailability is not a local issue. If it is, then the procedure ends.
4. Submit a Minor IMT ticket (following the Incident Management procedure (IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01)) where the following actions are requested:
 - 4.1.1. Request that DBAG validates availability of all XBID modules in order to confirm that there is no impact on the operations.
 - 4.1.2. Request that DBAG investigates the root cause of the Market Admin Tool unavailability.

Case 9: The SOB service is halted (not set to trading)

This case describes the required actions to follow when it is found that the **SOB service is halted** (not set to trading) even though the SOB is operational.

It can be also halted manually in case of maintenances or as a measure taken when reacting to issues such as those described in cases 1 and 6 of this NEMO_BUP_01 procedure.

One can find out about the halted service accidentally or after receiving the messages

Steps to be followed

1. Check the availability of SOB. If SOB is down, abandon this process description and follow

the case 3: *SOB down*.

2. Check in the SOB if the service is set to trading and not halted.
 - 2.1. If the service is set to trading, submit a Minor global ticket IMT ticket (following the Incident Management procedure (IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01)) requesting a root cause investigation why the service was halted temporary. Procedure ends.
 - 2.2. If the service is halted, submit a Critical global ticket IMT ticket (following the Incident Management procedure (IDCT_JOINT_FAL_01)) describing that the SOB service is halted. This will trigger an ICCC.

[Redacted content]

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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]