SIDC OPSCOM Report

Cancellation of the Intraday Auction IDA1 for Delivery Date 19/08/2026

26.10.2026

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1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the ENTSO-E and NEMO Committee websites.

1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through


Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.

At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.


Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.

MCSC Daily Timeline



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

IDA timeline



IDA 1	**14:40**	**14:45**	**15:00**	**15:20**
IDA 2	**21:40**	**21:45**	**22:00**	**22:20**
IDA 3	**09:40**	**09:45**	**10:00**	**10:20**

1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA

Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting Intraday Auction 1 (IDA1) on 18.08.2026, which resulted in the cancellation of the auction. The incident was caused by a failure in the IDA CIP connection. Although the second version of the Network Data had not arrived in PMB for any of the brokers, JAO confirmed that the IDA session could proceed using the first version. The absence of the second version was therefore not a blocking issue. However, the IDA CIP connection could not be restored, preventing result validation and the delivery of the Final Confirmation to PMB. This unresolved connection issue prevented the session from being completed within the available time.

Consequently, JAO cancelled the IDA session in CMM, after which it was aborted in PMB in accordance with the established procedures.

2.1 Course of Events

At approximately 14:57, the NEMO IDA coordinator observed that the IDA CIP connection went down. Given that the IDA CIP is a critical component for the execution of the Intraday Auctions (IDAs), an Incident Committee was convened shortly thereafter.

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence.	18/08/2026; 14:57	18/08/2026; 15:27
The NEMO IDA Coordinator saw that the IDA CIP connection was down and triggered an IC call.	18/08/2026; 15:00	18/08/2026; 15:27
During the IC call, JAO confirmed that the session could proceed using the first version of the Network Data. Once all orderbooks had been	18/08/2026; 15:00	

received, the calculation started without delay. **During the calculation, the IDA CIP service provider was called and requested to join the IC call.**		
All Preliminary Confirmations (PCs) were received in PMB, and the Global Preliminary Confirmation (GPC) was created. However, the connection to the IDA CIP was not re-established, result validation was not received and the Final Confirmation (FC) never arrived in PMB. **During the call, the IDA CIP service provider confirmed that they had opened a ticket with the hosting server provider and were unable to continue with the session.**	18/08/2026; 15:14	
JAO confirmed that the session was cancelled in the Capacity Management Module (CMM). The parties aborted the session in PMB.	18/08/2026; 15:27	
The IC was closed.	18/08/2026; 15:27	

2.3 Incident Cause

The incident was caused by a failure in the IDA-CIP connection. As the connection to CIP could not be restored, result validation could not be completed, preventing the Final Confirmation (FC) from being delivered to PMB. Consequently, the IDA1 was cancelled. The hosting server provider confirmed that the CIP connectivity issues were caused by an operational error on their side. The hosting server provider confirmed that the CIP issues were the result of an operational error that had been identified and fixed.

2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

Impacted NEMOs:

All relevant ones for intraday auctions.

Impacted Bidding Zones:

All relevant ones for intraday auctions.

Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:

All relevant for intraday auctions.

3. Mitigation Measures And Lessons Learnt

To ensure the successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party	The service provider has identified the following short-term measures to restore normal operation and confirm service recovery: ▸ Correct the configuration of the affected cluster and restart the infrastructure components impacted by the incident. ▸ Temporarily remove the affected security-auditing component from the production environment until further validation has been completed. ▸ Confirm that system load has returned to normal levels and that full service availability has been restored.
Long-term Measures by Affected Party	The following long-term mitigation measures have been identified by the service provider: ▸ Develop and validate an appropriate security-event logging configuration under representative workload and restart conditions before production deployment. ▸ Strengthen the automated validation, testing and peer review for critical infrastructure configuration changes. ▸ Enhance post-change monitoring to identify impacts on system resources, connectivity and application availability. ▸ Strengthen change-management and incident-response arrangements by assessing the combined impact of concurrent activities and ensuring timely escalation and access to technical support, including outside normal working hours.
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	The development of an IDA CIP backup solution is currently under discussion.