SIDC OPSCOM Report

Critical Incident Experienced on 29/08/2026

03.11.2026

SIDC

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1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.



For more information, please visit the ENTSO-E and NEMO Committee websites.[1]

[1] This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.

1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.


Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book. If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades. While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) provide cross-zonal capacity to the market as it becomes available.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until they close, or until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) deadline is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, physical delivery of power takes place. Continuous trading may still be possible after delivery, depending on the rules and capabilities of the local TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

SIDC continous normal operational process



*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some border the 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, the next will follows, for updates, please follow the ENTSO-e SIDC website.

IDCZG**O**T – intraday cross-zonal gate **opening** time
IDCZG**C**T – intraday cross-zonal gate **closing** time
CZC – cross-zonal capacity
MP – market party
LTS – local trading system
OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions

occur.

1.2. Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and any required communication to market participants.

Typically within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of a critical incident affecting the Single Intraday Coupling

(SIDC) market on 29.08.2026, resulting in a market interruption. The incident occurred during the planned Disaster Recovery Test (DRT) exercise. An unexpected service interruption affected the active core system. While the backup system attempted to take over as designed, concurrent planned activities prevented the transition from completing successfully, leading to a temporary service outage and market halt.The issue was resolved at 09:31 by the software provider. After that in the IC it was agreed by all parties to reopen the markets at 10:00 and the IC was ended at 11:24, after all parties confirmed that normal operations resumed.

2.1 Course of Events

- 08:57: Incident detected and incident ticket created.
- 09:15: Investigation initiated and Incident Committee triggered. Initial assessment focused on ongoing DRT activities.
- 09:31: Service restored and connectivity successfully re-established.
- 09:50: Confirmation provided that all parties were connected and that the service was operating normally.
- 10:00: Market unhalted and normal market operations resumed.

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence.	29/08/2026; 08:57	29/08/2026; 10:00
Triggering of Incident Committee.	29/08/2026; 09:00	29/08/2026; 11:24
Market Set back to trading.	29/08/2026; 10:00	

2.3 Incident Cause

An unexpected service interruption affected the active core system. While the backup system attempted to take over as designed, concurrent planned activities prevented the transition from completing successfully, leading to a temporary service outage and market halt.

2.4 Impact

Downtime	29/08/2026; 01:15
Critical Business Process Impacted	XBID trading
Procedural Impact	N/A

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure the successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Supplier's Short-Term Measures	During the incident, operational actions were taken to stabilize the platform. The service was restored through operational recovery activities, re-establishing Core availability and connectivity for all affected parties.
Supplier's Long-Term Measures	Following the incident, a lessons learned review was conducted. Opportunities were identified to further strengthen operational procedures and execution readiness for Disaster Recovery Test (DRT) activities. The identified lessons learned will be incorporated into future DRT planning and execution to reduce the risk of unintended service impacts during complex disaster recovery exercises.
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	N/A