SIDC OPSCOM Report

Critical Incident Experienced on 11/09/2026

03.11.2026

SIDC

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1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.



For more information, please visit the ENTSO-E and NEMO Committee websites.[1]

[1] This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.

1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.


Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book. If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades. While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) provide cross-zonal capacity to the market as it becomes available.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until they close, or until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) deadline is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, physical delivery of power takes place. Continuous trading may still be possible after delivery, depending on the rules and capabilities of the local TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

SIDC continous normal operational process



*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some border the 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, the next will follows, for updates, please follow the ENTSO-e SIDC website.

IDCZG**O**T – intraday cross-zonal gate **opening** time
IDCZG**C**T – intraday cross-zonal gate **closing** time
CZC – cross-zonal capacity
MP – market party
LTS – local trading system
OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions

occur.

1.2. Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and any required communication to market participants.

Typically within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of a critical incident affecting the Intraday Continuous Trading

(IDCT) market on 11/09/2026, resulting in a market halt of 3 hours and 47 minutes. The incident was caused by an issue with the XBID Service provider's Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure. The issue was resolved through the mitigation of the DNS infrastructure instability, followed by additional recovery and validation activities. Normal operations resumed at 01:45 on 12/09/2026.

2.1 Course of Events

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence.	11/09/2026; 21:58	12/09/2026; 01:45
Triggering of Incident Committee.	11/09/2026; 21:58	
The XBID Service provider identifies the infrastructure issue.	11/09/2026; 22:52	
The XBID Service provider informs that the issue is mitigated and they start with the recovery activities.	11/09/2026; 23:46	
Some modules of the XBID system are available again.	11/09/2026; 23:59	
The XBID Service provider informs that the issue is not fully resolved.	12/09/2026; 00:38	

All modules of the XBID system are available again.	12/09/2026; 01:20	
The XBID Service provider confirms that the issue is resolved and that XBID is operational again.	12/09/2026; 01:33	
NEMOs confirm that their systems are correctly connected to the XBID platform.	12/09/2026; 01:35	
Market is restored.	12/09/2026; 01:45	

2.3 Incident Cause

A DNS-related issue within the XBID service provider group-wide infrastructure caused instability in the DNS service resolution and disruptions to system communications. The issue was infrastructure-related and not caused by a defect in XBID business functionality.

The current analysis indicates that an approved infrastructure change resulted in an unexpected outcome within the DNS infrastructure, leading to the DNS instability and elevated latency affecting dependent services. This ultimately contributed to service degradation and the subsequent market halt.

2.4 Impact

Downtime	3 hours 47 minutes
Critical Business Process Impacted	XBID service provider's DNS infrastructure

Procedural Impact	N/A

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure the successful restoration of operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Supplier's Short-Term Measures	Mitigation measures were implemented to stabilize the DNS infrastructure and restore normal service operation.
Supplier's Long-Term Measures	Follow-up actions include strengthening the DNS infrastructure resilience, enhancing change management controls for critical infrastructure services, and improving validation processes for high-impact infrastructure changes.
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	N/A