# SIDC OPSCOM Report

# Cancellation of the Intraday Auction IDA2 for Delivery Date 27/08/2026

03.11.2026

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# 1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the ENTSO-E and NEMO Committee websites.

## 1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through


Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.

At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.


Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.

**MCSC Daily Timeline**



**SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T**

**IDA timeline**




| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IDA 1** | **14:40** | **14:45** | **15:00** | **15:20** |
| **IDA 2** | **21:40** | **21:45** | **22:00** | **22:20** |
| **IDA 3** | **09:40** | **09:45** | **10:00** | **10:20** |

# 1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA

Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

# 2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting the Intraday Auction 2 on 26.08.2026, resulting in the cancellation of the IDA following an Automatic Partial Decoupling (APD) of several NEMOs. The APD was caused by GME, which could not send the OBK due to an issue with the physical security checks in their Local Trading System. After the APD was performed, during the calculation process for the remaining NEMOs (OMIE and HENEX) an error was found, which led to the cancellation of the IDA2 session. The calculation process encountered an error due to an incorrect structure-level input data generated by repeated executions of the APD process.

## 2.1 Course of Events

## 2.2 Timeline

| Event | Start | End |
|---|---|---|
| **Incident occurrence.** | 26/08/2026; 22:03 | 26/08/2026; 22:32 |
| **GME informed they were experiencing some issues and they would have a delay in sending their OBK for IDA2 DD20260827.** | 26/08/2026; 22:03 | |
| **GME informed they would not be able to send the OBK in time for IDA2DD20260827.** | 26/08/2026; 22:12 | |
| **Triggering of Incident Committee.** | 26/08/2026; 22:12 | 26/08/2026;22:32 |
| **HEnEx took over the coordinator role and the** | 26/08/2026; 22:12 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Automatic partial decoupling started.** | | |
| **The calculation process started for HENEX and OMIE.** | 26/08/2026; 22:17 | |
| **The calculation process failed at startup due to invalid data, causing the optimization algorithm to terminate with constraint-related errors in both HENEX and OMIE PMB.** | 26/08/2026; 22:18 | |
| **OMIE and HENEX agreed to cancel the auction as there was not enough time to restart the session.** | 26/08/2026; 22:23 | |
| **IDA2 session was cancelled.** | 26/08/2026; 22:25 | |

## 2.3 Incident Cause

The Automatic Partial Decoupling was caused by an issue on GME side that was encountered during the IDA2 for the DD20260827 session.

The cause of the issue that led to the Automatic Partial Decoupling was that GME could not send the OBK due to an issue with the physical security checks in their Local Trading System. The process of checking margins for each unit took longer – in terms of time - than expected and the order book couldn't be generated on time.

The cancellation was caused by a calculation process error resulting from erroneous structure-level input data supplied to the algorithm. The incorrect input data was generated following an unintended multiple execution of the APD process.

## 2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

**Impacted NEMOs:**

All.

**Impacted Bidding Zones:**

All Bidding Zones.

**Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:**

All Borders.

# 3. Mitigation Measures And Lessons Learnt

To ensure the successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

| | |
|---|---|
| **Short-Term Solution by Affected Party** | GME improved its performance in the process of checking margins for each unit during the night. The next IDA on the next day, IDA 3, was run without any issue.<br><br>HEnEx has re-enforced internal procedures for proper execution of the Automatic Partial Decoupling process in PMB. |
| **Long-Term Measures by Affected Party** | GME has increased performance monitoring.<br><br>HEnEx has informed the service provider of the issue and a possible redesigning of the APD activation functionality is being discussed as means to avoid multiple activations. |
| **SIDC Project Lessons Learned** | N/A |