SIDC OPSCOM Report

Automatic Partial Decoupling of the Intraday Auction IDA1 for Delivery Date 18/09/2026

26.10.2026

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1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the ENTSO-E and NEMO Committee websites.

1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through


Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.

At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.


Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.

MCSC Daily Timeline



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

IDA timeline



IDA 1	**14:40**	**14:45**	**15:00**	**15:20**
IDA 2	**21:40**	**21:45**	**22:00**	**22:20**
IDA 3	**09:40**	**09:45**	**10:00**	**10:20**

1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA

Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting the Intraday Auction 1 on 17.09.2026, resulting in an Automatic partial decoupling of several NEMOs in line with procedures. The incident was caused by the absence of the OMIE Orderbook (OBK) in PMB by the Automatic Partial Decoupling (APD) deadline.

The root cause was the impossibility for Red Eléctrica (REE) to finalize the security analysis before 14:55.

2.1 Course of Events

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence: OMIE informed that they could not send the Order Data in time before the Gate Closure Time due to the Security Analysis issue on REE side.	17/09/2026 14:55	
Triggering of Incident Committee.	17/09/2026 14:59	17/09/2026 15:23
All NEMOs, except HENEX and GME, were automatically decoupled.	17/09/2026 15:12	
HENEX, as coordinator, sent the IDA_JOINT_07 Partial Decoupling email.	17/09/2026 15:14	

HENEX, as coordinator, sent the SIDC_JOINT_18 email.	17/09/2026 15:27	

2.3 Incident Cause

This incident was caused due to the impossibility for Red Eléctrica to finalize the security analysis before 14:55. This prevented the publication of the day-ahead security analysis results before the deadline required for OMIE to participate in IDA1. Consequently, OMIE was unable to generate the Order Book. This was identified only after the deadline for triggering the Manual PD during the session because of a TSO security analysis issue which led to the triggering of the Automatic Partial Decoupling process.

2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

Impacted NEMOs:

All except HEnEX and GME.

Impacted Bidding Zones:

All Bidding Zones except GR and IT.

Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:

All Borders except GR-IT and IT internal borders.

3. Mitigation Measures And Lessons Learnt

To ensure the successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party	N/A
Long-term Measures by Affected Party	N/A
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	Although the Manual Partial Decoupling procedure has proven to mitigate the frequency of Automatic Partial Decouplings, there is no bullet-proof solution to completely avoid the application of Automatic Partial Decoupling due to incidents affecting a single NEMO in case the root cause takes place after the deadline established in the said procedure.